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Do Federal Reserve Communications Help Predict 
Federal Funds Target Rate Decisions? 
 
Abstract 
We explain federal funds target rate decisions using macroeconomic variables and Federal 
Reserve communication indicators. Econometrically, we employ an ordered probit model of a 
Taylor rule to predict 75 target rate decisions between 1998 and 2006. We find, first, that our 
communication indicators significantly explain target rate decisions and improve explanatory 
power in and out of sample. Second, speeches by members of the Board of Governors and 
regional presidents have a statistically significant and equal-sized effect, whereas the less-
frequent monetary policy reports and congressional hearings are insignificant. Third, our 
findings are robust to variations in the specification, including changes in the communication 
strategy. Finally, our communication indicator based on Federal Reserve speeches performs 
better in explaining target rate decisions than do newswire reports of Fed communications. 
 
JEL:   E43, E52, E58 
Keywords:   Central Bank Communication, Federal Reserve Bank, Interest Rate Decision, 
Monetary Policy, Federal Funds Target Rate, Taylor Rule 3 
1.  Introduction 
Central bank communication is now widely accepted as an important aspect of monetary 
policy. Woodford (2005, 55) concludes that “the increased willingness of the FOMC under 
the Chairmanship of Alan Greenspan to speak openly about both current policy decisions and 
the Committee’s view of likely future policy has greatly increased the ability of markets to 
anticipate Fed policy.” 
The U.S. Federal Reserve System (Fed) engages in several methods of 
communication: post-meeting statements accompanying target rate decisions, the semi-annual 
monetary policy report (mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act of 1978), 
congressional hearings, and speeches by members of the Board of Governors and regional 
presidents. Usually, all these give a 12–18-month economic outlook for the United States. In 
recent years, it has become common practice to indicate the future course of U.S. monetary 
policy, too. The more formalized channels, such as statements and monetary policy reports, 
are used infrequently (8 and 2 events per year, respectively). Other new information of 
relevance to financial market expectations is conveyed by speeches. Several studies show that 
U.S. financial market returns and volatility are affected by these less formal types of 
communication (e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008). 
In this paper, we focus on the question of whether the Fed’s informal communication 
actually contains useful information about future monetary policy that agents could not have 
acquired otherwise. Put differently, does Fed communication provide information additional 
to that already incorporated in a real-time forward-looking Taylor rule? Our prior is that 
communication—if used properly—can improve forecasts based on a benchmark Taylor rule. 
While monthly data about output and inflation expectations are adjusted on pre-scheduled 
dates, communication can be employed more timely, accurately, and can be based on a 
broader range of indicators. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize 
previous work in this area and outline our contributions to the field. Section 3 describes the 
construction of our communication indicators and the other variables, as well as the 
econometric methodology. In Section 4, we investigate whether communication helps explain 
and predict target rate decisions. Section 5 presents further specifications and robustness 




2.  Related Literature and Our Contribution 
There is an ongoing theoretical debate about the usefulness of central bank communication. 
The vast majority of researchers highlight the positive effects of communication in terms of 
enhancing central bank transparency (see, e.g., Woodford, 2005; Sibert, 2006; Gosselin et al., 
2007).
1 Well-executed communication aids private agents in recognizing the central bank’s 
objectives and strategy. Furthermore, it also increases understanding of recent target rate 
changes and prepares the market for future target rate changes. If an interest rate decision is 
already expected by market participants, their adjustment costs will be minimized (see, e.g., 
Woodford, 2001), as they can take the expected interest rate decision into consideration in 
advance of it taking effect. 
The extent to which central bank communication has been successful in practice is an 
empirical issue (for a broad overview of the literature, see Blinder et al., 2008). Generally, the 
literature discussing communication as an instrument for explaining target rate decisions 
employs a Taylor-rule framework. There are only a few studies on the Fed, which we review 
first. Pakko (2005) finds that post-meeting statements convey useful information for 
forecasting changes in the federal funds rate target, even after controlling for policy responses 
to inflation and the output gap. Lapp and Pearce (2000) show that a bias in the statement 
accompanying Federal Reserve policy decisions significantly affects the probability that the 
target will be changed in the period between two meetings. Lapp et al. (2003) discover that 
Fed decisions are not highly predictable using publicly available data, and that adding private 
information contained in the Greenbook (available after a five-year delay) does not 
significantly increase predictive accuracy. All three studies underestimate the explanative and 
predictive power of Fed communication, as they neglect the less formal channel of speeches, 
which can be used more timely and accurately than post-meeting statements. Thus, we expect 
our approach to be more successful as it explicitly addresses this problem. 
Other papers assess the predictive power of European Central Bank (ECB) 
communication. Jansen and de Haan (2009) find that communication-based models do not 
outperform models based on macroeconomic data in predicting decisions. Heinemann and 
Ullrich (2007) show that a wording indicator measuring the “hawkishness” of the ECB’s 
monthly press conferences can improve the model’s fit when added to the standard 
explanatory variables. However, a model based solely on this indicator performs worse than 
                                                            
1 A noticeable exception is the work by Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato et al. (2002), who argue against 
frequent central bank communication. They show that a (small) increase in the precision of the information 
released by a public authority can be welfare-reducing as it decreases the importance of privately formed 
information. Svensson (2006) reverses this argument: he proves that this outcome emerges only under quite 
special circumstances as the central bank must have much less precise information than private agents. 5 
the baseline Taylor rule. Gerlach (2007) estimates empirical reaction functions using the 
ECB’s Monthly Bulletin as a guide in choosing variables. Overall, in regard to the ECB, there 
is no evidence for an improvement of a Taylor rule due to more timely and accurate 
information possibly spread by communication. Nonetheless, similar to the literature on the 
Fed, we suspect that these studies underestimate the total effect of communication, as they do 
not include all types of ECB communication. 
In this paper, we explain federal funds target rate decisions using macroeconomic 
variables and Federal Reserve communication indicators. To our knowledge, which is backed 
up by Blinder et al.’s (2008) literature review, there are no other studies explaining U.S. target 
rate decisions using all types of Federal Reserve communication (post-meeting statements, 
monetary policy reports, congressional hearings, and speeches). The communications are 
analyzed on the basis of their written contents. Econometrically, we use an ordered probit 
model to take into account the discrete nature of U.S. target rate decisions. Our sample starts 
on February 4, 1998 and ends on December 12, 2006, a period that shows an increasing trend 
in the overall number of communication events.
2 
 
3.  Data and Econometric Methodology 
In this paper, we present the empirical results of estimating different variations of a Taylor 
rule (see Section 4), including: (i) a pure Taylor rule using only lagged target rate decisions 
and macroeconomic variables; (ii) target rate decisions modeled as depending on lagged 
decisions and communication variables; and (iii) an assessment of a model that includes both 
macroeconomic and communication variables. 
Our analysis takes advantage of a new data set introduced by Hayo et al. (2008), 
which includes indicator variables for 1,423 speeches and 148 congressional hearings, 
covering all governors and regional presidents of the Federal Reserve System, as well as 67 
post-meeting statements and 20 monetary policy reports. The communications are sorted into 
three categories depending on whether they indicate likely increases in the federal funds rate, 
decreases in the rate, or no change in the target rate. Communications that directly reference 
monetary policy are easily interpreted; others are not so straightforward. For example, 
speeches presenting a bright economic outlook can be interpreted as an indication of future 
rate hikes because in good economic times, the Fed needs to take steps to prevent the 
economy from overheating. Hayo et al. (2008) point out that the Fed typically does not talk 
                                                            
2 In 1998, 114 speeches were delivered by governors and presidents; in 2006 the central bankers spoke 190 
times. The starting point of our sample is the first year for which the Federal Reserve Bank and its regional 
branches systematically began publishing all speeches of by its governors and presidents.  6 
extensively about rate cuts and therefore a speech about a negative economic outlook can be a 
particularly useful indicator of this possibility.
3 
Consequently, we employ a ternary variable for every communication event. The 
variable takes the value +1 when the central bank leans toward a rate hike, 0 when the 
monetary policy will likely remain unchanged, and –1 when loose monetary policy is a strong 
possibility.
4 Our sample contains 75 target rate decisions. Often, more than one 
communication event takes place in the period between Fed meetings. Therefore, we need an 
indicator that captures the monetary policy stance over the entire inter-meeting period. For 
this purpose, we net out the instances of tighter and looser monetary policy inclinations and 
code the communication indicator accordingly.
5 If the amount of downward and upward news 
is equal, or if no communication events occur during an inter-meeting period, the variable is 
coded 0. 
Visual illustrations of the last statement indicator and our communication indicator are 
shown in Figures 1a and 1b. The former is included to extract the impact of inter-meeting 
communication from the information available after every target rate decision. Compared 
with the actual target rate decisions, there is a bias toward target rate hikes in the 
communication indicator (Figure 1b). This bias is related to the fact that Fed representatives 
often give a (too) positive economic outlook in times of unchanged monetary policy. Jansen 
and de Haan (2009) find a similar phenomenon for the ECB. Furthermore, based on our 
communication indicator, we find that the Fed is very cautious about mentioning rate cuts in 
too much detail. Only when a rate cut is truly imminent, will the majority of speeches signal 
such a decision. Except for two outliers in 2001, our communication indicator turns negative, 
or at least becomes neutral, when the Fed lowers its target rate at the next meeting. The last 
statement indicator (Figure 1a) is less subject to an overly optimistic economic outlook; it 
reflects the Fed’s interest rate setting very well. One drawback is its availability: the Fed has 
                                                            
3 In a very few cases, a positive economic outlook coincides with a trend toward loose monetary policy, or a 
pessimistic outlook is accompanied by tighter monetary policy. As the monetary policy stance is a more direct 
indicator of future target rate decisions, we code these rare cases based on monetary policy stance. 
4 We could also use a scale up to +2 (down to –2) when both monetary policy and economic outlook point in the 
same direction. However, as pointed out earlier, the Fed increased the frequency and the content of its 
communication gradually during our sample, so a scaling up to +2 could distort the results as earlier speeches 
often lack a monetary policy part. Furthermore, it is questionable whether an indication via both variables makes 
a rate change more likely. Finally, preliminary estimations show that the +1/0/–1 coding approach is more 
appropriate. 
5 For example, in our view, eight indications of higher monetary policy do not result in an eight-times-higher 
probability of a rate hike. Consequently, we use the +1/0/–1 scale and ensure the validity of our results with 
extensive robustness tests. We also controlled for the time distance to the upcoming interest rate decision when 
creating our communication indicator. Information with regard to the upcoming interest rate decision could be 
considered more useful the closer the communication takes place to the actual event. However, in our sample, 
using this additional information slightly decreases the explanatory power of our indicator. 7 
made regular statements only since May 1999.
6 Therefore, the indicator fails to predict target 
rate cuts in the autumn of 1998, which are captured by the communication indicator. We 
expect both indicators to help explain the Fed’s interest rate setting behavior, as sometimes 
the communication indicator reflects information available only after the interest rate 
decision. 
 
Figure 1a: Federal Funds Target Rate and Last Post-Meeting Statement 
Note: The federal funds target rate is the black line. For the last statement indicator, + means that the indicator 
suggests rate increase, ● that the rate is expected to be constant, and – means that the indicator suggests a rate 
decrease. 
 
Figure 1b: Federal Funds Target Rate and Communication Indicator 
Note: The federal funds target rate is the black line. For the communication indicator, + means that the indicator 
suggests rate increase, ● that the rate is expected to be constant, and – means that the indicator suggests a rate 
decrease. 
 
Our econometric methodology is a variation of the interest rate setting rule proposed 
by Taylor (1993). We use real-time data (Orphanides, 2001) available at the time the interest 
                                                            
6 Since May 1999, the Fed makes a regular statement after every interest rate decision. As we are interested in 
the last statement, this change is effective for the interest rate decision in June 1999. Prior to May 1999, 
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rate decisions are made, instead of ex post revised data.
7 Central banks need to be forward-
looking when planning interest rate decisions, as the maximum monetary policy effect reaches 
the real economy with a lag of about 12–18 months. Therefore, we employ forward-looking 
indicators measuring the output gap and inflation (expectations) instead of backward-looking 
ones based on past economic conditions. A study by Molodtsova et al. (2008) supports our 
choice; they estimate Taylor rules for the United States and discover that the best fit occurs 
using real-time output data and inflation forecasts. 
We take the perspective of financial agents who want to predict interest rate setting by 
the Fed. As internal Greenbook data are available only after a five year delay, agents must 
proxy the Fed’s estimates of the relevant macroeconomic variables. Therefore, we utilize the 
ISM Manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index as a proxy for the forward-looking output gap 
(Hu and Philipps, 2004). Inflation expectations gathered by the University of Michigan in its 
Consumer Survey approximate inflation expectations over the next 12 months (Kauppi, 
2007).
8 To ensure stationarity of expected inflation, we compute first differences. The output 
gap is derived based on the relative deviation of the ISM index from its expansion threshold 
value at 50 points.
9 
Econometrically, we use an ordered probit model to account for the discrete nature of 
U.S. target rate decisions (Lapp et al., 2003; Jansen and de Haan, 2009). Our specification is: 
 1                       
 
                                ∆                         
                                          .                
 
where                      
  is the latent continuous variable representing the change in 
the federal funds target rate. Again, we use a ternary variable (+1 represents a rate hike; 0 an 
unchanged rate; –1 a rate cut) to describe the change in monetary policy.
10 Target rate 
                                                            
7 The macroeconomic data used in this survey were taken from the St. Louis Fed’s Archival Federal Reserve 
Economic Database. 
8 Preliminary regressions reveal that including the actual level of inflation (see, e.g., Gerlach, 2007) in Equation 
(1) yields negative and insignificant coefficients for several inflation measures as well as a diminished ability to 
explain interest rate decisions. 
9 Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) show that the 
output gap series and the first difference of the inflation series are stationary. ISM Gap: ADF –2.09**, KPSS 
0.105; Δ(Inflation Expectations): ADF –10.46***, KPSS 0.096. The ADF test assumes a unit root under the null 
hypothesis. The KPSS test assumes that the series is stationary under the null hypothesis. */**/*** denotes 
significance at the 10/5/1% level. 
10 During our sample period, the Fed raised or lowered the target rate 10 times by 50 bps, and 29 times by 25 
bps. Instead of the ternary variable, we could use a quintuple (+2/+1/0/–1/–2) variable to describe Fed behavior. 
It turns out that the modeling describes very well whether rate hikes/cuts occur or not, but it largely fails to 
differentiate between small and large interest rate steps. This is also a problem in other studies (e.g., Jansen and 
de Haan, 2009). 9 
changes occur only when the value of the index function is either below a lower unobserved 
threshold τ1 or higher than an upper unobserved threshold τ2. 
Our Taylor rule incorporates three groups of explanatory variables. First, lagged target 
rate decisions are included to capture interest rate smoothing behavior.
11 Second, output gap 
and expected inflation capture forward-looking macroeconomic information. Third, 
communication enters the equation via two variables: lagged post-meeting statements
12 (Lapp 
and Pearce, 2000; Pakko, 2005) and our communication indicator. The residuals εt are 
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, which implies that the probabilities of the 
different outcomes can be written as: 
Pr                          1 |     Φ         
    
Pr                        0 |     Φ         
     Φ         
    
Pr                        1 |     Φ         
    
 
where  Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and zt is our vector of 
explanatory variables. The ordered probit models are estimated by maximum likelihood 
(Maddala, 2006) and the threshold variables are obtained simultaneously with the vector of 
estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables β. 
 
4.  Explaining Target Rate Decisions with Federal Reserve Communications 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical estimations employing different 
specifications based on Equation (1). Column (1) of Table 1 shows the model based on 
macroeconomic news only,
13 Column (2) incorporates communication variables only, and the 
Column (3) specification uses both types of information. 
Measured by the pseudo R
2, the joint model (Column (3)) has a slightly better fit than 
the communication model in Column (2), whereas the macro model (Column (1)) is clearly 
the worst. Interest rate smoothing is evident in all three specifications, as lagged target rate 
decisions help predict current ones. The coefficients of inflation expectation and output gap 
are significant in the Taylor-rule model and they remain significant in the joint model. The 
same is true of both communication variables (last post-meeting statement and 
                                                            
11 We employ a lagged dependent variable rather than an autoregressive error specification (Rudebusch, 2002) 
based on results presented by Castelnuovo (2003). Note, however, that the interpretation of interest rate 
smoothing behavior is still a subject of debate (Rudebusch, 2006). 
12 Post-meeting statements after unscheduled meeting changes are treated like regular post-meeting statements. 
Thus, agents include these in their information set to predict decisions at the next regular meeting. 
13 We test for endogeneity in our regressions by instrumenting the ISM gap and the change in inflation 
expectations by their respective lagged values. A Hausman test does not reject the null of exogeneity (Chi
2(2) = 
0.81). 10 
communication indicator), which are also significant in the communication and joint 
models.
14 Table 1 also shows that the communication indicator improves the model’s ability 
to correctly explain target rate decisions. Model (2) correctly predicts six more target rate 
decisions than does the pure Taylor rule of Model (1). The joint model (Model (3)), however, 
is not an improvement on Model (2) as it mis-predicts one more event than does Model (2). 
 
Table 1: Explaining Target Rate Decisions with Federal Reserve Communication 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
Last Rate Decision  1.82 ***  1.80 ***  2.05  *** 
ISM Gap  0.07 ***  ---    0.04  * 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  0.68 * ---     0.77  * 
Last Statement  --- 2.84 ***  2.88  *** 
Communication Indicator  --- 1.91 ***  1.81  *** 
Lower Threshold  –1.33 ***  –2.21 ***  –2.47  *** 
Upper Threshold  1.88 ***  5.38 ***  5.94  *** 
LR Statistic  61.03 ***  29.06 ***  35.91  *** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –36.72 –23.50 –21.30 
Pseudo R
2 0.53   0.70     0.73   
Correct Predictions  59/75  65/75  64/75 
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Huber (1967)/White (1980) robust standard errors are 
used. 
 
Table 2 shows the average marginal effects.
15 In the Taylor rule specification (Model 
(1)), the probability of a target rate hike goes up by 27.4 percentage points (pp) after a hike 
was implemented after the last meeting (instead of an unchanged target rate), while the 
probability of a rate cut increases by 19.9 pp after a decrease in the variable. If the output gap 
rises, a rate hike is more likely by 1.2 percentage point, whereas after a corresponding 
reduction, the probability of a cut goes up by 0.7 pp. Finally, higher inflation expectations 
raise the chance of a rate hike by 11.2 pp, while a decline increases the likeliness of a cut by 
6.8 pp. 
When using only communication variables to predict Federal Reserve decisions, the 
importance of interest rate smoothing decreases (21.4 pp for rate hikes; 7.0 pp for cuts). Some 
                                                            
14 Four unscheduled interest rate changes occurred between meetings during our sample period. Between two 
meetings, new information about the state of economy or inflation expectations emerges that is not reflected in 
the last statement or by the macroeconomic variables. Consequently, when controlling for inter-meeting changes, 
the coefficient of our communication indicator increases slightly, as the Fed can disseminate new information 
through speeches and prepare the public for a possible change before the next scheduled meeting. Results are 
available on request. 
15 The following discussion focuses on what happens to the probability of a rate hike if the exogenous variable 
takes the value of 1 instead of 0 (last rate decision, last statement, and communication indicator) or increases by 
one percentage point (ISM gap and inflation expectations). Opposite conclusions hold in the case of rate cuts. 
The probabilities of an unchanged target rate are not discussed due to space constraints. 11 
information in the lagged rate decisions is captured by the combined influence of statements 
and the communication indicator.
16 A one-point change in the last statement makes a rate hike 
more likely by 28.1 pp; the corresponding downward shift increases the chance of a rate cut 
by 10.7 pp. The same change in the communication indicator also modifies the probability of 
target rate changes (22.3 pp for rate hikes; 7.4 pp for cuts). 
 
Table 2: Average Marginal Effects for Models (1)–(3) 
   Prob[Rate Cut]  Prob[No Change]  Prob[Rate Hike] 
Model (1) Taylor Rule          
Last Rate Decision  –0.199 ***  –0.075 ***  0.274  *** 
ISM Gap  –0.007 ***  –0.005 ***  0.012  *** 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  –0.068 * –0.044 *  0.112  * 
Model (2) Communication 
Last Rate Decision  –0.070 ***  –0.144 ***  0.214  *** 
Last Statement  –0.107 ***  –0.173 ***  0.281  *** 
Communication Indicator  –0.074 ***  –0.150 ***  0.223  *** 
Model (3) Taylor Rule and Communication  
Last Rate Decision  –0.072 ***  –0.145 ***  0.217  *** 
ISM Gap  –0.001 *  –0.003 *  0.005  * 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  –0.028 * –0.065 *  0.092  * 
Last Statement  –0.098 ***  –0.168 ***  0.266  *** 
Communication Indicator  –0.064 ***  –0.134 ***  0.198  *** 
Notes: The figures show the average of marginal effects over all observations. */**/*** denotes significance at 
the 10/5/1 % level. 
 
In the joint model, the average marginal effects of both macro variables become 
smaller, suggesting collinearity with the communication variables. The latter’s average 
marginal effects remain significant, and similar to the values shown for Model (2). 
Consequently, the information in Federal Reserve communication partly crowds out publicly 
available information about the output gap and inflation expectations. The influence of the 
last post-meeting statement is larger than that of the communication indicator in Models (2) 
and (3), implying that the Fed follows its interest rate course between two meetings (see 
Figures 1a and 1b), whereas the communication indicator provides less new information. 
To this point, we have shown the importance of the communication variables for 
explaining the Fed’s target rate decisions. In a next step, we compare the probability of 
                                                            
16  The lesser impact of the lagged interest rate cannot be clearly assigned to either last statements or the 
communication indicator. 12 
predicting the correct actual decision (hike, no change, or cut) at each Federal Reserve 
meeting using the pure communication Model (2) and the pure Taylor rule (Model (1)). The 
differences are plotted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Gain in Predictability of Target Rate Decisions Due to Consideration of Federal 
Reserve Communications 
Note: The Y-axis indicates the communication model’s (Model (2)) gain (in percentage points) in making the 
correct prediction compared to the Taylor rule (Model (1)). 
 
There are five decisions where Model (2) gains 75 percentage points or more over 
Model (1); in six other cases, the increase is at least 25 pp. In contrast, there is no case where 
Model (2) performs more poorly than 50 pp, the worst performance being –38 pp. The 
average gain of the pure communication model over the pure Taylor-rule model is 11 pp. 
Thus, as expected, use of communication indicators, because they are more timely and 
accurate, substantially improves the probability of making the correct prediction. 
Given the absence of necessary data, we cannot study the models’ out-of-sample 
performance. However, to approximate an out-of-sample assessment, we re-estimate Models 
(1)–(3) initially for the subsample 1998–2002. Then, we predict target rate decisions for the 
remaining period using recursive out-of-sample forecasts, which requires re-estimating the 
model after every period.
17 
Table 3 reveals that the predictive ability of the communication-based Model (2) is 
excellent—30 out of 32 interest rate decisions are correctly anticipated. The two wrong 
predictions occur at the start and the end of the 2004–2006 tightening cycle (June 30, 2004 
                                                            
17 We start by estimating each model using the first 43 observations and then evaluate whether the model 
correctly predicts the interest rate decision at t = 44. Next, we re-estimate the models using the first 44 
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and August 8, 2006). The joint Model (3) performs well, too (25 correct predictions), whereas 
the pure Taylor rule (Model (1)) does more poorly (23 correct predictions). 
 
Table 3: Approximating Out-of-Sample Predictions Using Recursive Estimations 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Target Rate Cuts  0/1  1/1  1/1 
No Change in Target Rate  9/14  13/14  8/14 
Target Rate Hikes  14/17  16/17  16/17 
All Rate Decisions  23/32  30/32  25/32 
Notes: The initialization period is 1998–2002 (43 rate decisions) and parameters are updated every period 
throughout the remaining sample period 2003–2006 (32 rate decisions). 
 
As an alternative to recursive estimations, we can test temporal stability by estimating 
parameters over the period 1998–2002 and using the resulting models to derive predictions by 
plugging in values of the relevant variables in each period. Table 4 shows that the 
communication model (Model (2)) holds up extremely well with regard to stability, whereas 
Model (1), and Model (3) even more so, suffer from a deterioration of predictive ability. 
 
Table 4: Approximating Out-of-Sample Predictions Using a Fixed Estimation Period 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Target Rate Cuts  0/1  1/1  1/1 
No Change in Target Rate  9/14  13/14  6/14 
Target Rate Hikes  11/17  16/17  16/17 
All Rate Decisions  20/32  30/32  23/32 
Notes: The initialization period is 1998–2002 (43 rate decisions) and the out-of-sample period is 2003–2006 (32 
rate decisions). 
 
Testing parameter instability using Chow-type tests at a 5% confidence level (see 
Figure 3), demonstrates that we can reject constancy in the case of the Taylor rule (Model 
(1)), but not for the communication model (Model (2)). These results suggest that the 
communication model is a robust and reliable device for predicting federal funds rate 
decisions, even out-of-sample. 
 14 
Figure 3: Parameter Stability of Models (1) and (2) 
(1) Taylor Rule Model 
Last Rate Decision  ISM Gap  Δ(Inflation Expectations) 
 
(2) Communication Model 
Last Rate Decision  Last Statement Communication  Indicator 
Notes: Parameter estimates based on one-step updating over the period 2003–2006 and 95% confidence bands 
based on coefficient estimates from the subsample 1998–2002. 
 
5.  Further Results and Robustness Tests 
The outcome of alternative specifications and robustness tests are given in Table 5. Poole 
(2005) discusses the steps the Fed undertook in an effort to enhance its transparency in post-
meeting statements. For example, in August 2003, the Fed replaced the “policy bias/balance 
of risks” terminology with more forward-looking language. Model (4) of Table 5 explores 
whether this forward-looking indicator exerts a different impact on the predictability of target 
rate decisions. We cannot statistically distinguish between either indicator (Chi
2(1) = 1.11), 
implying that the change in language did not improve the predictive power of Fed 
communications.
18 
Four unscheduled interest rate changes occurred between meetings during our sample 
period. Model (5) of Table 5 explores the robustness of our findings with respect to inter-
                                                            
18 Another effort to increase transparency was implemented in January 2002: henceforward, the names of 
dissenting members were included in the post-meeting statement. Previously, this information had not been 
available until the minutes were released following the subsequent Federal Reserve meeting. To control for 
dissenting votes, we include a variable measuring the lagged dissenter’s impact. The prior is that any dissent in 
the last meeting in either direction should increase the probability of a rate decision in line with the dissenter’s 
vote. Unfortunately, we have collinearity problems, as the model converges only if all communication variables 
are excluded. However, even in this setup involving fewer explanatory variables, the dissenter’s impact is 
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meeting changes. The latter are modeled as ternary variables, with the value +1 assigned to an 
unscheduled hike, 0 to a regular decision, and –1 if an inter-meeting cut took place. Although 
the coefficients for the last statement, the communication indicator, and the inter-meeting 
moves are large, the marginal effects are comparable to those in the earlier regressions.
19 
 
Table 5: Further Results in Explaining Target Rate Decisions 
   (4) (5) (6) 
Last Rate Decision  2.26 ***  2.05 ***  2.21  *** 
ISM Gap  0.06 **  0.04 –0.02 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  0.84 * 0.80 *  0.91  * 
Last Statement  ---    11.60 ***  2.82  *** 
Last Statement Bias/Balance 3.27 ***  --- --- 
Last Statement Forward-Looking  2.50 ***  ---    ---    
Communication Indicator  2.01 **  6.11 ***  --- 
MPR --- --- –0.12 
Testimony --- --- 0.29 
Governor’s Speech  --- --- 1.16  ** 
President’s Speech  --- --- 1.23  ** 
Lagged Inter-Meeting Move  ---    11.22 ***  ---    
Lower Threshold  –2.84 ***  –7.16 ***  –2.17  ** 
Upper Threshold  6.35 ***  18.93 ***  5.07  *** 
LR Statistic  30.35 ***  250.06 ***  23.37  *** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –20.56 –19.60 –21.05 
Pseudo R
2 0.74   0.75     0.73   
Correct Predictions  64/75  66/75  67/75 
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Huber/White robust standard errors are used. 
 
Model (6) of Table 5 examines the impact of different types of Fed communication. 
Monetary policy reports and congressional hearings have no significant impact, either 
individually or jointly (Chi
2(2) = 0.48). These types of communication occur too infrequently 
to contain up-to-date information.
20 However, speeches are made much more regularly and 
often contain updates on the business cycle and expected inflation. Consequently, we find that 
speeches by both groups, governors and regional presidents, significantly help explain interest 
rate decisions. Statistical testing shows that the coefficients of both groups (Chi
2(1) = 0.01) 
are indistinguishable. Measured by the number of correct predictions (see last line of Table 5), 
Model (4) provides no improvement over the more parsimonious Model (2), whereas Models 
                                                            
19 For example, the average marginal effects of the lagged inter-meeting moves are 27.8/10.1 pp for rate 
hikes/cuts. 
20 We observe only 17 nonzero events for MPRs and 19 for congressional hearings. 16 
(5) and (6) reveal that controlling for inter-meeting moves or further disaggregation of 
communication leads to slightly better predictability.
21 
Hayo et al. (2008, 27) examine how financial markets react to central bank 
communication and conclude that “financial market news is not necessarily created at the 
time when the information becomes available [the time when a speech is actually delivered], 
but comes into existence only after it goes through a filtering process by the media.” To 
discover whether this media filtering is also present when predicting target rate decisions, we 
compare our communication indicator with a variable based on news agency reports collected 
by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). Questions arise as to whether this filtering process helps 
agents cope with the flood of information and if it is an accurate representation of the Fed’s 
view. Put differently, does the media distort central bank communication to such a degree that 
observing the original source is more useful? 
To answer these questions, we need to shorten our sample period to May 1999–May 
2004 (43 observations) so as to match that of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). In line with the 
procedure sketched above, we derive a communication indicator for the news agency data. 
Since the newswire information does not include post-meeting statements, we omit these from 
our set of communication variables to ensure comparability. Table 6 reports the results using 
the communication indicator created on the basis of our data (Model (7)), the newswire 
reports (Model (8)), and using both indicators in one equation (Model (9)). 
 
Table 6: Explaining Target Rate Decisions Using Newswire Reports  
   (7) (8) (9) 
Last Rate Decision  1.06 *  1.45 ***  1.25  ** 
ISM Gap  0.06 ***  0.04 0.03 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  0.38 1.02 * 0.56 
Comm. Ind.  0.93 **  ---    0.95  ** 
Comm. Ind. News Agency Reports  ---    0.68    0.68    
Lower Threshold  –0.68 *  –1.46 ***  –1.14  * 
Upper Threshold  2.66 ***  1.99 ***  2.69  *** 
LR Statistic  30.88 ***  28.41 ***  24.35  *** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –20.55 –21.45 –18.59 
Pseudo R
2  0.50    0.48    0.55    
Notes: */**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Huber/White robust standard errors are used. 
 
                                                            
21 We also try to account for possible dispersions in communication. An additional variable is added to Equation 
(3) that measures the impact of unambiguous communication. We would expect unequivocal communication to 
have a positive impact on the predictability of target rate decisions. The coefficient is positive, as expected, but 
statistically insignificant. Results are available on request. 17 
The newswire communication indicator is not significant in either Model (8) or Model 
(9), whereas our communication variable significantly explains target rate decisions in both 
Models (7) and (9). We conclude that newswire reports of central bank communications are 
not a substitute for the original communication when predicting federal funds target rate 
decisions. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we explain federal funds target rate decisions by means of macroeconomic 
variables and various forms of Federal Reserve communication. We focus on the question of 
whether Fed communications contain information additional to that already incorporated in a 
real-time forward-looking Taylor rule. 
The communication variables (lagged statements and our communication indicator) 
provide a significant and robust explanation of the Fed’s target rate decisions. They help 
correctly predict six additional target rate decisions compared to a Taylor rule and increase 
the probability of making correct forecasts by an average of 11 percentage points over all 
target rate decisions. Furthermore, the communication variables help generate quite accurate 
one-step-ahead forecasts: the outcome of 30 out of 32 Federal Reserve meetings over the 
period 2003–2006 is correctly predicted. In addition, the coefficients associated with the 
communication indicators are stable over time, whereas variables in the forward-looking 
Taylor-rule model are plagued by instability. 
Regarding different types of communication, speeches by governors and regional 
presidents have a statistically significant and equal-sized effect. The infrequency of monetary 
policy reports and congressional hearings tends to make their impact insignificant. Our 
findings are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. Changes in Fed transparency do 
not significantly affect our results. When controlling for inter-meeting target rate changes, our 
coefficients remain significant. Our communication indicator explains rate decisions much 
better than does an indicator derived from news agency reports collected by Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2007). 
The results of our study suggest that the Fed’s communication, particularly in its more 
informal guise (e.g., speeches by Federal Reserve Governors and Presidents), contains useful 
information about future monetary policy. Agents cannot acquire this information by relying 
on a Taylor rule even if this is forward-looking. In other words, the Fed prepares the public 
for its monetary policy decisions through informal methods of communication and private 18 
agents’ inferences about Fed decisions based on a Taylor rule are not a perfect substitute for 
this information. 
Our inferences are based on data mainly from a period when Alan Greenspan was 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank. The chairmanship of Ben Bernanke (starting in 
February 2006) did not cause a noticeable break in the out-of-sample predictions and the 
parameter stability tests of our communication model (Model (2); see Tables 3 and 4 and 
Figure 3). However, since these results are based on seven target rate decisions only, it would 
be interesting to examine the impact of the more recent years of Bernanke’s chairmanship. In 
particular, further studies could address two crucial questions: (1) Do the latest steps taken to 
increase the Fed’s transparency
22 affect agents’ ability to predict target rate decisions? And 
(2) Does the recent economic and financial crisis have an influence on the importance of 
central bank communication? Our prior is that central bank communication will be 
increasingly helpful as the Fed continues the course started during the Greenspan era and 
continues to increase its openness in communication. Furthermore, the recent economic and 
financial crisis caused central banks to cut their target rates very quickly. Abrupt changes and, 
in particular, inter-meeting changes can be prepared for better by timely communication than 
by monthly economic data. 
                                                            
22 For example, in 2007, the Fed announced that it will make economic projections for longer periods (three 
years instead of two) and distribute these more often (four times a year instead of two) in an effort to shed light 
on the likely path of interest rates and optimal levels of inflation. 19 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Mean Max.  Min. Std.  Dev. +1  0  –1 
Target  Rate  Decisions  0.09  --- --- 0.72 23 36 16 
ISM  Gap  4.87  32.4  –20.4  11.02 --- --- --- 
Δ(Inflation Expectations)  0.01 1.5 –1.8 0.46  ---  ---  --- 
Statements  0.29  --- --- 0.82 39 19 17 
Communication  Indicator  0.64  ---  --- 0.73 59 5 11 
MPR  0.15  --- --- 0.46 14 58  3 
Testimony  0.15  --- --- 0.49 15 56  4 
Governor’s  Speeches  0.36  --- --- 0.75 39 24 12 
Presidents’  Speeches  0.63  ---  --- 0.73 58 6 11 
 